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Abstract
We consider the distributed facility location problem, in which there is a set of agents positioned
on the real line, who are also partitioned into multiple symmetric districts. e goal is to choose
a single location (where a public facility is to be built) so as to minimize the total distance of the
agents from that location. Importantly, this process is distributed: the positions of the agents in
each district are first aggregated into a representative location for the district, and then one of
the representatives is chosen as the facility location. is indirect access to the positions of the
agents inevitably leads to inefficiency, which is captured by the notion of distortion. We study
both the discrete version of the problem, where the set of alternative locations if finite, as well as
the continuous one, where every point of the line is an alternative. For both versions, we paint an
almost complete picture of the distortion landscape of distributed mechanisms. We start from the
discrete seing, for which we show a tight bound of 3 on the distortion of general mechanisms
and a tight bound of 7 for strategyproof mechanisms. For the continuous seing, we show that
the distortion of general mechanisms lies between 2 and 3, whereas the distortion of strategyproof
mechanisms is exactly 3.
1 Introduction
Social choice theory deals with the aggregation of different, oen contrasting opinions into a common
decision. ere are many applicationswhere the nature of the aggregation process is distributed, in the
sense that it is performed in the following two steps: smaller groups of people first reach a consensus,
and then their representative choices are aggregated into a final collective decision. is can be due to
multiple reasons, such as scalability (local decisions are much easier to coordinate when dealing with
a large number of individuals), or the inherent roles of the participants (for example, being member
states in the European Union or electoral bodies in different regional districts). However, although
oen necessary, this distributed nature is known to lead to outcomes that do not accurately reflect the
views of society. A prominent example of this fact is the 2016 US presidential election, where Donald
Trump won despite receiving only 46.1% of the popular vote, as opposed to Hillary Clinton’s 48.2%.
To quantify the inefficiency that arises in distributed social choice seings, recently Filos-Ratsikas
et al. [33] adopted and extended the notion of distortion, which is broadly used in social choice theory to
measure the deterioration of an aggregate objective (typically the utilitarian social welfare) due to the
lack of complete information,1 and thus provides a systematic way of comparing different mechanisms
for aggregating the preferences of individuals. In their work, Filos-Ratsikas et al. considered a very
1e distortion was originally defined by Procaccia and Rosenschein [55] who considered the lack of information that is
the result of having access only to the ordinal preferences of the individuals instead of their actual valuations. In contrast,
Filos-Ratsikas et al. [33] focused on the lack of information that comes from not knowing the details of local decisions.
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general social choice scenario with unrestricted agent preferences, and showed asymptotically tight
upper and lower bounds on the distortion of plurality-basedmechanisms. We follow a similar approach
in this paper for a fundamental structured domain of agent preferences, thewell-known facility location
problem on the line of real numbers.
e facility location problem is one of the most important in social choice and has been considered
in both the economics and the computer science literature. It is a special case of the domain of single-
peaked preferences (studied originally by Black [13] and popularized by Moulin [50] in his seminal
paper) equipped with linear agent cost functions. Furthermore, it is the most prominent seing where
the agents havemetric preferences, and as such it has been studied extensively in the related distortion
literature for centralized seings [6, 10]. Finally, facility location was the paradigm used by Procaccia
and Tennenholtz [56] to put forward their agenda of approximate mechanism design without money,
which resulted in a plethora of works in computer science ever since.
In the agenda of Procaccia and Tennenholtz, the goal is to design mechanisms with the following
two properties: (a) they are strategyproof in the sense that they do not provide incentives to the agents
to lie about their true preferences, and (b) they have good performance in terms of some aggregate
objective, as measured by having low approximation ratio. e need for approximation now comes
from the requirement for strategyproofness, rather than the lack of information. In fact, the distortion
and the approximation ratio are essentially two sides of the same coin, differentiated by the reason for
the loss in efficiency. We will be concerned with distributed mechanisms, both strategyproof and not,
in a quest to quantify the effect of distributed decision making on facility location, both independently
and in conjunction with strategyproofness. Hence, our work follows both the agenda of approximate
mechanism design [56] and of distributed distortion [33], and can be cast as approximate mechanism
design for distributed facility location.
1.1 Our Setting and Contribution
We study the distributed facility location problem on the real line R. As in the standard centralized
problem, there is a set of agents with ideal positions and a set of alternative locations where the facility
can be built. We consider both the discrete seing, where the set of alternatives is some finite subset
of R, as well as the continuous seing, where the set of alternatives is the whole R. In the distributed
version, the agents are partitioned into districts of equal size, and the aggregation of their positions into
a single facility location is performed in two steps: In the first step, the agents of each district select
a representative location for their district, and in the second step, one of the representatives is chosen
as the final facility location. A distributed mechanism is a function which implements this aggregation
process.
Our objective is to find the mechanismwith the smallest possible distortion, which is defined as the
worst-case ratio (over all instances of the problem) between the social cost of the location chosen by
the mechanism and the minimum social cost over all locations; the social cost of a location is the total
distance between the agent positions and the location. Note that the optimal location is calculated as
if the agents are not partitioned into districts, and thus the distortion accurately measures the effect of
selecting the facility location in a distributed manner to the efficiency of the system. We are also inter-
ested in strategyproof mechanisms, for which the distortion actually quantifies the loss in performance
both due to the lack of information as well as due to the strategyproofness requirement. We obtain the
following set of results:
• For the discrete seing, the best possible distortion by any mechanism is 3, and the best possible
distortion by any strategyproof mechanism is 7.
• For the continuous seing, the best possible distortion by any mechanism is between 2 and 3,
and the best possible distortion by any strategyproof mechanism is 3.
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Discrete Continuous
General mechanisms 3 ∈ [2, 3]
Strategyproof mechanisms 7 3
Table 1: Our bounds on the distortion of general and strategyproof mechanisms for discrete and continuous
distributed facility location. In the discrete seing, the lower bound of 7 also holds for ordinal (not necessarily
strategyproof) mechanisms. e upper bound of 3 for general mechanisms is achieved by theMinimizeMedian
mechanism, while the upper bound of 7 for strategyproof mechanisms is achieved by the DistributedMedian
mechanism, which is also an ordinal mechanism. In the continuous seing, the upper bound of 3 for both general
and strategyproof mechanisms is achieved by the continuous version of DistributedMedian, which is actually
an implementation ofMinimizeMedian.
ese results are summarized in Table 1.
For our upper bounds, the mechanisms we design are adaptations of well-known mechanisms for
the centralized facility location problem. In the discrete seing, the mechanism with the best possible
distortion of 3 selects the representative of each district to be the location that minimizes the social
cost of the agents therein, and then chooses the median representative as the facility location; we refer
to this mechanism asMinimizeMedian. By modifying the first step of aggregation so as to select the
representative of a district to be the location that is the closest to the median agent in the district,
we obtain the DistributedMedian mechanism, which is the best possible strategyproof mechanism
with distortion 7. When we move to the continuous seing, selecting the median agent within each
district in fact minimizes the social cost of the agents in the district, and thus DistributedMedian is
an implementation ofMinimizeMedian. e proofs of our upper bounds in Sections 3 and 5.1 heavily
rely on a characterization of the structure of the worst-case instances (in terms of distortion) for each
of these mechanisms; this characterization is obtained by carefully modifying the positions of some
agents without decreasing the distortion (see Section 3.1).
For the lower bounds, we employ the following main idea. We construct instances of the problem
for which any mechanismwith low distortion (depending on the bound we are aiming for) must satisfy
some constraints about the representative y it can choose for a particular district, namely, either that
y is some specific location (in the discrete seing), or that it must lie in some specific interval (in
the continuous seing). en, because of the distributed nature of the mechanism, we can exploit
the fact that y must represent this district in any instance that contains it, and use such instances to
either argue about the distortion of the mechanism, or to impose constraints on the representative
locations of other districts. At the heart of all of our constructions lies one type of crucial lemma
(see Lemma 4.1 for an example) which establishes that, at least for the instances we consider, any
mechanismmust select themedian representative in the second step of aggregation. e proofs of these
lemmas are similar in the sense that they use the idea highlighted above repeatedly and inductively, and
in conjunction with arguments involving strategyproofness when necessary. However, they are also
notably different because they apply to different seings (discrete vs continuous) or to mechanisms
with different distortion bounds (3 or 2 for general vs 7 or 3 for strategyproof).
Interestingly, when given as input the particular instances we use in the proof of the lower bound
in the discrete seing, strategyproof mechanisms exhibit an ordinal behavior. Consequently, the very
same proof can be used to show that the lower bound of 7 also holds for ordinal mechanisms, which
do not take into account the actual positions of the agents, but instead base their decisions only on the
preference rankings that the positions of the agents induce over the alternative locations. Furthermore,
this bound is tight since DistributedMedian is in fact ordinal (whereas MinimizeMedian is not).
Finally, observe that ordinality is not a meaningful property in the continuous seing, as every single
position induces a different preference ranking over locations.
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1.2 Related Work
enotion of the distortion of social choicemechanisms, as well as the corresponding research agenda,
was initiated by Procaccia and Rosenschein [55], who considered an unrestricted preference seing in
which the agents have normalized cardinal valuations and the objective is to choose a single winning
alternative. A subsequent stream of papers studied several variants of the problem, including the origi-
nal single-winner seing [15, 17], multi-winner elections [18], participatory budgeting [11, 40], as well
as seings showcasing tradeoffs between the distortion and cardinal information [4, 48, 49], Moreover,
there are quite a few papers that have studied the distortion of strategyproof mechanisms [12, 19, 30,
31]. In its original definition, the distortion measured the performance of ordinal mechanisms in terms
of a cardinal objective, namely the utilitarian social welfare (the total utility of the agents for the chosen
outcome). However, if one interprets more generally the lack of information as the reason for the loss
in efficiency, the distortion actually captures much wider scenarios, like the distributed social choice
seing studied by Filos-Ratsikas et al. [33].
Although the number of papers dealing with (variants of) the aforementioned normalized seing
is substantial, the literature on the distortion flourished aer the work of Anshelevich et al. [10] and
Anshelevich and Postl [6], who studied seings in which the agents have metric preferences. Such
preferences are constrained by the fact that the utility (or cost in the particular case) of every agent
for different alternatives must satisfy the triangle inequality, which effectively results in the distortion
bounds being small constants, rather than asymptotic bounds depending on the number of agents and
alternatives, as it is typically the case in the normalized seing. Similar investigations have given rise
to a plethora of papers on this topic; see [1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 26, 29, 38, 39, 42, 44, 51].
As already mentioned earlier, the facility location problem plays an important role in the literature
at the intersection of computer science and economics. From a purely algorithmic perspective, facility
location problems have a long history in the area of approximation (e.g., see [62]). At the same time,
manyworks in economics have studied such problems [14, 54, 57] in the context of Euclidean preferences
[43], a special case of the celebrated class of single-peaked preferences [13, 50]; see also [24, 53]. e
problem became extremely popular in the economics and computation community aer Procaccia
and Tennenholtz [56] used it to put forward their agenda of approximate mechanism design without
money, following the similar agenda of Nisan and Ronen [52] for seings with money. Since then, the
facility location problem has been studied extensively, for different objectives [3, 16, 27, 28], multiple
facilities [25, 36, 46, 47], different domains [58, 65, 64, 63], different cost functions [32, 37], and several
variants of the problem [5, 20, 22, 21, 23, 34, 35, 41, 45, 61, 60, 66, 59].
Despite the long and extensive literature on the problem and the many different approaches, to the
best of our knowledge, the distributed version of the problem has not been studied prior to this paper,
either in the context of distortion or that of mechanism design.
2 Preliminaries
We consider the discrete and the continuous distributed facility location problem. In both seings, there
is a set N of n agents who are positioned on the line of real numbers; let xi ∈ R denote the position
of agent i, and denote by x = (xi)i∈N the position profile of all agents. e agents are partitioned
into k ≥ 2 districts; let D be the set of districts, and denote by d(i) the district containing agent i. Let
Nd = {i ∈ N : d(i) = d} be the set of agents that belong to district d ∈ D. We consider symmetric
districts, which consist of the same number of agents λ = nk . We will use the notation xd = (xi)i∈Nd
for the restriction of x to the positions of the agents in district d, and we will refer to xd as a district
position profile. We say that two districts d and d′ are identical if xd = xd′ .
For two points x, y ∈ R, let δ(x, y) = δ(y, x) = |x − y| denote their absolute distance. Given a
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position profile x, the social cost of a point z ∈ R is the total distance of the agents from z:
SC(z|x) =
∑
i∈N
δ(xi, z).
Our goal is to select a location z∗ from a set of alternative locations Z ⊆ R to minimize the social cost,
that is,
z∗ ∈ argmin
z∈Z
SC(z|x).
In the discrete seing, the set of alternative locations is finite and denoted byA. On the other hand, in
the continuous seing, the set of alternative locations is the whole R. erefore, we have that either
Z = A in the discrete version, or Z = R in the continuous version.
We use the term instance to refer to a tuple I = (x,D,Z) consisting of a position profile x, a set of
districtsD, and a set of alternative locationsZ ; we omit the set of agentsN from the definition of the
instance as it is implied by x. In the continuous seing, since the set of alternative locations is clear,
we will simplify our notation and use a pair (x,D) to denote an instance.
If we had access to the positions of all the agents, it would be easy to select the optimal location in
both versions of the problem. However, in our seing this is not possible as the positions are assumed
to not be globally known, only locally. To decide the facility locationwe deploy distributed mechanisms,
to which we will simply refer asmechanisms from now on. A mechanismM consists of the following
two steps of aggregation:
• First step: For every district d ∈ D,M aggregates the positions of the agents therein into the
representative location zd ∈ Z of d. is step is local, in the sense that the representative zd is a
result of the corresponding district profile xd only. Formally, for any two instances that contain
two identical districts d1 and d2,Mmust choose the same representative for both districts, that
is, zd1 = zd2 ∈ Z . Essentially, this property stipulates that the representative of a district is
chosen only by the members of the district, and independently of agents in other districts.
• Second step:M aggregates the district representatives into a single facility location. For a given
instance I = (x,D,Z), we denote byM(I) the facility location chosen by the mechanism.
2.1 e distortion of mechanisms
Due to the lack of global information, the facility location chosen by a mechanism will inevitably be
suboptimal. To quantify this inefficiency, we adopt and extend the notion of distortion to our seing.
e distortion of an instance I = (x,D,Z) subject to using a mechanismM is the ratio between the
social cost of the locationM(I) chosen by the mechanism given I as input and the social cost of the
optimal location OPT(I) = argminz∈Z SC(z|x) for the instance:
dist(I|M) =
SC(M(I)|x)
SC(OPT(I)|x)
.
en, the distortion of mechanismM is the worst-case distortion over all possible instances:
dist(M) = sup
I
dist(I|M).
We will now argue that it is without loss of generality to focus on mechanisms satisfying a simple
unanimity property (within the districts). In particular, we say that a mechanismM is unanimous, if it
chooses the representative of a district to be z ∈ Z , whenever all agents of the district are positioned
at z. e proof of the following lemma can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 2.1. Any mechanism with finite distortion must be unanimous.
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2.2 Strategyproofness
Besides mechanisms with good efficiency, we are also interested in mechanisms which ensure that the
agents report their positions truthfully, in the sense that they have no incentive to misreport hoping
to change the outcome of the mechanism to a location that is closer to their true position. Formally, let
I = (x,D,Z) be an instance, where x is the true position profile of the agents, and let J = (y,D,Z)
be any instance with position profile y = (yi,x−i), in which agent i reports yi and all other agents
report their positions according to x. A mechanismM is strategyproof if the location chosen byM
on input I is closer to the position xi of every agent i than the location chosen byM on input J . In
other words, it must be that
δ(xi,M(x,D,Z)) ≤ δ(xi,M((yi,x−i),D,Z))
for every agent i and yi ∈ R.
e added requirement of strategyproofness imposes further restrictions, and potentially impacts
the achievable distortion as well. Consequently, our goal is to design strategyproof mechanisms with
as low distortion as possible for both seings, discrete and continuous.
Next, we define the class of mechanisms which are strategyproof within districts. Intuitively, such
mechanisms prevent the agents from misreporting their positions hoping to change the representative
of their district to a location closer to them. Observe that in principle a strategyproof mechanism could
allow such a local manipulation, only to eliminate it in the second step of aggregation (for example,
by completely ignoring the representatives and choosing an arbitrary fixed facility location). We show
that for mechanisms with a finite distortion, this is impossible.
Formally, let I = (x,D,Z) be an instance, where x is the true position profile of the agents, and let
J = (y,D,Z) be any instance with position profile y = (yi,x−i). A mechanismM is strategyproof
within districts if for any district d ∈ D, the representative of d on input I is closer to the position xi of
every agent i than the representative of d on input J . We can now show the following useful property
of stratefyproof mechanisms; the proof is deferred to the appendix.
Lemma 2.2. LetM be a strategyproof mechanism with finite distortion. en,M has to be strategyproof
within districts.
3 Mechanisms for the discrete setting
We begin the exposition of our results from the discrete seing. We consider two natural mechanisms,
which we call MinimizeMedian (MM) and DistributedMedian (DM). Given the representatives of
the districts, both mechanisms select the facility location to be the median representative. e main
difference between the two mechanisms is on how they select the representatives of the districts: MM
selects the representative of each district to be the alternative location that minimizes the social cost
of the agents within the district, while DM selects the representative of each district to be the location
which is closer to the median agent in the district. In case there are at least two median representatives
or at least two locationsminimizing the social cost within some district, the mechanisms select the le-
most such option.
As one might expect, the fact that MM minimizes the social cost within the districts may give the
opportunity to some agents therein to misreport their positions hoping to affect the outcome. On the
other hand, by choosing themedian location bothwithin and over the districts, DM does not allow such
manipulations. Formally, we have the following statement, whose proof is deferred to the appendix.
eorem 3.1. MM is not strategyproof, while DM is strategyproof.
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Mechanism 1:e MinimizeMedian and DistributedMedian mechanisms.
Mechanism MM(x,D,A)
for each district d ∈ D do
zd ← le-most location in argminz∈A
∑
i∈Nd
δ(xi, z)
return Median({zd}d∈D)
Mechanism DM(x,D,A)
for each district d ∈ D do
zd ← argminz∈A δ(Median(xd), z)
return Median({zd}d∈D)
RuleMedian(y)
η ← |y|
sort y = (y1, ..., yη) in non-decreasing order
return y⌊η/2⌋
In the rest of this section, we focus on bounding the distortion of the two mechanisms. To do so, we
first show in Section 3.1 that the instances achieving the worst-case distortion have a very particular
structure, which is common for bothmechanisms. We then exploit this structure in Section 3.2 to show
an upper bound of 3 on the distortion of MM and an upper bound of 7 on the distortion of DM.
3.1 Worst-case instances
We start by characterizing the structure of worst-case instances for any mechanismM ∈ {MM,DM}.
Let wc(M) be the class of instances I = (x,D,A) such that
(P1) For every agent i ∈ N ,
– xi ≥M(I) ifM(I) < OPT(I), or
– xi ≤M(I) ifM(I) > OPT(I).
(P2) For every z ∈ A which is representative for a set of districts Dz 6= ∅, the positions of all agents
in the districts of Dz are in the interval defined by z and OPT(I).
We will show the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. e distortion ofM∈ {MM,DM} is equal to
sup
I∈wc(M)
dist(I|M).
Proof. LetM ∈ {MM,DM}. It suffices to show that for every instance J 6∈ wc(M), there exists an
instance I ∈ wc(M), such that dist(J |M) ≤ dist(I|M). Due to symmetry, we only focus on the
case whereM(J ) = w < o = OPT(J ). We gradually transform J into I as follows:
(T1) We move every agent with position strictly smaller than w to w.
(T2) For every location z which is representative for a set of districts Dz 6= ∅ in J , we move every
agent in Dz whose position does not lie in the interval defined by z and o to the boundaries of
this interval:
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xi w z xj o xt
(a) Initial instance: agent i does not satisfy (P1) and
(P2); agent j satisfies both properties; agent t does
not satisfy (P2).
xi w z xj o xt
(b) Application of (T1): agent i is moved to w so
that (P1) is satisfied.
xi w z xj o xt
(c) Application of (T2): agent i is further moved to
z so that (P2) is satisfied.
xi w z xj o xt
(d) Application of (T2): agent t is moved to o so
that (P2) is satisfied.
Figure 1: An execution of the transformations used in the proof of Lemma 3.2. e three agents i, j and t belong
to the same district with representative z; w is the facility location chosen by mechanismM ∈ {MM,DM} and
o is the optimal location. Transformation (T1) will first move agent i from xi to w so that (P1) is satisfied, and
then transformation (T2) will move both i and t to the boundaries of the interval [z, o] so that (P2) is satisfied. In
the proof of the lemma, we show that moving the agents in this way does not affect the facility location chosen
by the mechanism nor the optimal location, while at the same time the distortion can only become larger.
– For z < o, if the position of the agent is strictly smaller than z we move her to z, and if it
is strictly larger than o we move her to o;
– For z > o, if the position of the agent is strictly larger than z we move her to z, and if it is
strictly smaller than o we move her to o.
Observe that, because (T1) is performed before (T2), an agent with position strictly smaller than w <
z < o who belongs to a district inDz can be moved twice: once from her initial position tow and then
again to z; see Fig. 1 for an example. Naturally, these transformations define a sequence of intermediate
instances with the same set of districts and alternative locations, but different position profiles. We
will show that these instances preserve the following three properties, which are sufficient to show by
induction that the distortion does not become smaller as we go from J to I :
• e facility location chosen by the mechanism is always w;
• e optimal location is always o;
• For any two consecutive intermediate instanceswith position profilesx andy,
SC(w|x)
SC(o|x) ≤
SC(w|y)
SC(o|y) .
Before we continue with the proof of the properties, we state here two useful technical lemmas, whose
proofs can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 3.3. Let x be a vector consisting of the positions of a set of agents S such that
∑
i∈S δ(xi, z) ≤∑
i∈S δ(xi, y) for z < y. en, for every p ∈ (z, y), it holds that
∑
i∈S δ(xi, p) ≤
∑
i∈S δ(xi, y).
Lemma 3.4. Let x be a (district) position profile, and denote by z the optimal location for x. en, moving
any single agent i with xi < p ≤ z or xi > p ≥ z to p, induces a position profile p = (p,x−i) for which
the optimal location is again z.
e facility location is always w:M = MM.
For (T1), consider any intermediate instance with position profile x such that there exists a district
d ∈ D with representative zd = z, which contains some agent i with xi < w who is moved to w. We
distinguish between two cases:
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• z > w. Since z is the optimal location for xd, Lemma 3.4 with p = w implies that moving i from
xi < w < z to w does not affect the optimality of z. Hence, z remains the representative of d,
and consequently w remains the facility location chosen by MM.
• z ≤ w. In this case, moving i to w, does not necessarily imply that z remains the representative
of d. However, we claim that the new representative location y can only be such that y ≤ w,
which guarantees thatw remains themedian representative, and thus the facility location chosen
by MM.
Assume otherwise that the new representative location is y > w, in which case the total distance
of the agents in d from y is strictly smaller than fromw (note that if it was equal,wwould become
the representative because of the tie-breaking used by the mechanism):
δ(w, y) +
∑
j∈Nd\{i}
δ(xj , y) < δ(w,w) +
∑
j∈Nd\{i}
δ(xj , w).
However, since δ(w, y) = δ(xi, y)− δ(xi, w) and δ(w,w) = 0, we equivalently have that
∑
j∈Nd
δ(xj , y) <
∑
j∈Nd
δ(xj , w),
which, since z < w < y and z minimizes the total distance under x, contradicts the fact that the
total distance from w is less than the total distance from y; this is implied by Lemma 3.3 when
restricted to the agents in d.
For (T2), consider any intermediate instance with position profile x such that there exists an alternative
location z ≤ o (the case z < o can be handled similarly) which is representative for a set of districts
Dz 6= ∅, and some district d ∈ Dz contains an agent i with position xi 6∈ [z, o]. Since z is optimal for
xd, and i is either moved to z if xi < z or to o if o < xi, Lemma 3.4 (constrained to xd, with either
p = z or p = o for the two cases, respectively) implies that the optimality of z in d is not affected by
moving i. Hence, z remains the representative of d, and w is still chosen by MM.
e facility location is always w:M = DM.
For (T1), like in the case of MM, consider any intermediate instance with position profile x such that
there exists a district d ∈ D with representative zd = z, which contains some agent i with position
xi < w who is moved to w. We distinguish between two cases:
• z > w. Since i is closer to w than to z, she cannot be the median agent in district d. erefore,
moving agent i tow will not change the representative of d, and thus neither the location chosen
by DM.
• z ≤ w. By moving agent i tow, the representative of dmay change from z to w, but the location
chosen by DM will remain the same. In particular, since w is the median among all the district
representatives, it will also remain the median aer being the representative of more districts.
For (T2), consider again any intermediate instance such that there exists an alternative location z ≤ o
which is representative for a set of districts Dz 6= ∅, and some district of Dz contains an agent i with
position xi 6∈ [z, o]. We distinguish between two cases:
• xi < z. If i is the median agent in d, then the fact that z is the representative of dmeans that z is
the closest location to i, and thus moving i to z does change the representative of d. On the other
hand, if i is not the median, then moving i to z either does not alter who the median agent is
(and thus the representative) or i becomes the median and z continues to be the representative.
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• xi > o. Since i is closer to o than to z, the only case in which i might be the median agent of
d is when z = o, and moving i to o clearly does not affect the representative of d. In any other
case, i is not the median agent and cannot become the median (as there must exist an agent who
is closer to z than to o).
erefore, since moving i to the boundaries of [z, o] does not affect the representative of d, the location
w chosen by DM remains the same as well.
e optimal location is always o.
Observe that the transformations we perform define two symmetric types of moves: an agent i can be
moved either from a position xi < p ≤ o to p, or from a position xi > p ≥ o to p, where p ∈ A.
Consequently, Lemma 3.4 immediately implies that any such move does not affect the optimality of o
in the induced instance.
e distortion does not get smaller between consecutive instances.
For (T1), consider two consecutive instanceswith position profilesx andy = (w,x−i) inwhich a single
agent i moves from a position xi < w to w. Since δ(xi, o) = δ(xi, w) + δ(w, o) and δ(w,w) = 0, we
have
SC(w|x)
SC(o|x)
=
δ(yi, w) +
∑
j 6=i δ(xj , w)
δ(xi, o) +
∑
j 6=i δ(xj , o)
=
δ(xi, w) + δ(w,w) +
∑
j 6=i δ(xj , w)
δ(xi, w) + δ(w, o) +
∑
j 6=i δ(xi, o)
=
SC(w|y) + δ(xi, w)
SC(o|y) + δ(xi, w)
.
Now, we can use the inequality
α+ γ
β + γ
≤
α
β
, (1)
which holds for every α, β, γ such that α ≥ β and γ ≥ 0. In particular, since SC(o|x) ≤ SC(w|x), by
seing α = SC(w|x), β = SC(o|x), γ = δ(xi, w) ≥ 0, we obtain that
SC(w|x)
SC(o|x)
≤
SC(w|y)
SC(o|y)
.
For (T2), consider an intermediate instance with position profile x and let z ∈ A be a location
such that z ≤ o (the case z ≥ o can be handled similarly) which is representative for a set of districts
Dz 6= ∅ and there exists an agent i in Dz positioned at xi 6= [z, o]. We will show that the distortion
of the instance obtained by moving only agent i to the boundaries of [z, o] is at least as large as that of
the previous instance. We distinguish between two cases:
• xi < z. In this case, agent i is moved to z yielding an instance with position profile y = (z,x−i).
By the fact that (T1) is performed before (T2) and the assumption of this case, we have that
xi ∈ [w, z). Hence,
δ(xi, w) = xi − w = z − w − (z − xi) = δ(z, w) − δ(xi, z) ≤ δ(z, w).
Furthermore, since xi ≤ o, we also have that
δ(xi, o) = o− xi = o− z + z − xi = δ(z, o) + δ(xi, z) ≥ δ(z, o).
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Consequently,
SC(w|x)
SC(o|x)
=
δ(xi, w) +
∑
j 6=i δ(xj , w)
δ(xi, o) +
∑
j 6=i δ(xj , o)
≤
δ(z, w) +
∑
j 6=i δ(xj , w)
δ(z, o) +
∑
j 6=i δ(xj , o)
=
SC(w|y)
SC(o|y)
.
• xi > o. Now, agent i is moved to o yielding an instance with position profile y = (o,x−i). Since
o > w, we have that
δ(xi, w) = xi − w = xi − o+ o− w = δ(xi, o) + δ(o,w).
Hence, we have
SC(w|x)
SC(o|x)
=
δ(xi, w) +
∑
j 6=i δ(xj , w)
δ(xi, o) +
∑
j 6=i δ(xj , o)
=
δ(xi, o) + δ(o,w) +
∑
j 6=i δ(xj , w)
δ(xi, o) + δ(o, o) +
∑
j 6=i δ(xj , o)
=
SC(w|y) + δ(xi, o)
SC(o|y) + δ(xi, o)
.
Now, since o is still the optimal location, we have that SC(o|y) ≤ SC(w|y), and by applying (1)
with α = SC(w|y), β = SC(o|y) and γ = δ(xi, o), we finally obtain
SC(w|x)
SC(o|y)
≤
SC(w|x)
SC(o|y)
.
is completes the proof of the lemma.
3.2 Bounding the distortion
Given the class of instances wc(M) for anyM ∈ {MM,DM} and the characterization of Lemma 3.2,
we are ready to bound the distortion of both mechanisms. Before we dive into the analysis, we present
some useful notation, which will be used throughout the proofs presented in this section. Consider any
instance I = (x,D,A) ∈ wc(M). Due to symmetry, it will suffice to consider only the case where
M(I) = w < o = OPT(I). For every alternative location z ∈ A, let Dz be the set of districts for
which z is the representative; that is, zd = z for every d ∈ Dz . Also, let Z = {z ∈ A : Dz 6= ∅} be the
set of all alternative locations that are representative for at least one district. Observe that since the
location w is selected by the mechanism, it must be the case that w ∈ Z . For every z ∈ Z and y ∈ A,
let
SCz(y|x) =
∑
d∈Dz
∑
i∈Nd
δ(xi, y)
be the total distance of all the agents in the districts ofDz from y. Also, recall that each district contains
exactly λ agents.
eorem 3.5. e distortion ofMM is at most 3.
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Proof. Consider any instance I = (x,D,A) ∈ wc(MM) with MM(I) = w < o = OPT(I). We make
the following observations:
• Consider any alternative location z ∈ A such that Dz 6= ∅. By property (P2), for any district
d ∈ Dz , we have that δ(z, o) = δ(xi, z) + δ(xi, o) for every agent i ∈ Nd. Hence, by summing
over all agents in the districts of Dz , we have
SCz(z|x) + SCz(o|x) = δ(z, o) · λ|Dz|.
Since z is chosen as the representative of each district d ∈ Dz , it is the location that minimizes
the total distance of the agents in d, that is,
∑
i∈Nd
δ(xi, z) ≤
∑
i∈Nd
δ(xi, o). us, by summing
over all districts in Dz , we have that
SCz(z|x) ≤ SCz(o|x).
By combining the above two expressions, we obtain
SCz(z|x) =
1
2
δ(z, o) · λ|Dz |. (2)
and
SCz(o|x) ≥
1
2
δ(z, o) · λ|Dz|. (3)
• Consider any alternative location z ∈ Z \{w}. By property (P1), we have thatw is the le-most
representative, and thus z > w. By (P2), we have that every agent i in a district ofDz lies in the
interval defined by z and o, which means that
– δ(xi, w) ≤ δ(w, o) if z ≤ o, and
– δ(xi, w) ≤ δ(w, z) = δ(w, o) + δ(z, o) if z > o.
Since δ(z, o) ≥ 0, by summing over all the agents in the districts of Dz , we obtain that
SCz(w|x) ≤
(
δ(w, o) + δ(z, o)
)
· λ|Dz|. (4)
• Sincew is the le-most representative (implied by (P1)) and themedian among all representatives
(which is why it is selected by the mechanism), it must be the case that w is the representative
of more than half of the districts, and thus
|Dw| ≥
∑
z∈Z\{w}
|Dz|. (5)
Given the above observations, we will now upper-bound the social cost of w and lower-bound the
social cost of o (in order to obtain an upper bound on the distortion of I subject to using MM). By the
definition of SC(w|x), and by applying (2) for y = w and (4) for z 6= w, we obtain
SC(w|x) = SCw(w|x) +
∑
z∈Z\{w}
SCz(w|x)
≤
1
2
δ(w, o) · λ|Dw|+
∑
z∈Z\{w}
(
δ(w, o) + δ(z, o)
)
· λ|Dz|
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=
1
2
δ(w, o) · λ|Dw|+ δ(w, o) · λ
∑
z∈Z\{w}
|Dz|+
∑
z∈Z\{w}
δ(z, o) · λ|Dz|.
By (5), we further have that
SC(w|x) ≤
3
2
δ(w, o) · λ|Dw|+
∑
z∈Z\{w}
δ(z, o) · λ|Dz|
≤
3
2
∑
z∈Z
δ(z, o) · λ|Dz|. (6)
On the other hand, by the definition of SC(o|x) and by applying (3), we can lower-bound the optimal
social cost as follows:
SC(o|x) =
∑
z∈Z
SCz(o|x) ≥
1
2
∑
z∈Z
δ(z, o) · λ|Dz|. (7)
Consequently, by combining (6) and (7), the distortion of the instance I subject to MM is
dist(I|DM) =
SC(w|x)
SC(o|x)
≤ 3.
Since I is an arbitrary (up to symmetry) instance of wc(DM), Lemma 3.2 implies dist(DM) ≤ 3.
Next, we bound the distortion of DM.
eorem 3.6. e distortion of DM is at most 7.
Proof. Consider any instance I = (x,D,A) ∈ wc(DM) with DM(I) = w < o = OPT(I). We make
the following observations:
• Consider any district d ∈ Dz . By property (P2), we have that δ(z, o) = δ(xi, z) + δ(xi, o) for
every agent i ∈ Nd. Furthermore, by combining the fact that all agents in Nd lie in the interval
defined by z and o, together with the fact that the median agent of d is closer to z than to o, we
have that there exists a set Sd ⊆ Nd of agents in d with |Sd| ≥
1
2λ such that δ(xi, z) ≤ δ(xi, o)
for every i ∈ Sd. Consequently, δ(xi, z) ≤
1
2δ(z, o) for every i ∈ Sd, and δ(xi, z) ≤ δ(z, o) for
every i ∈ Nd \ Sd. We obtain
SCz(z|x) =
∑
d∈Dz
∑
i∈Nd
δ(xi, z)
=
∑
d∈Dz
(∑
i∈Sd
δ(xi, z) +
∑
i∈Nd\Sd
δ(xi, z)
)
≤
∑
d∈Dz
(
1
2
δ(z, o) · |Sd|+ δ(z, o) · |Nd \ Sd|
)
= δ(z, o) ·
∑
d∈Dz
(
λ−
1
2
|Sd|
)
≤
3
4
δ(z, o) · λ|Dz|. (8)
• By summing the equality δ(xi, o) = δ(z, o)− δ(xi, z) over all agents i in the districts ofDz and
using (8), we obtain
SCz(o|x) = δz,o · λ|Dz| − SCz(z|x)
≥
1
4
δ(z, o) · λ|Dz|. (9)
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• Using the same arguments as in the proof of eorem 3.5 for MM, we can show that inequalities
(4) and (5) hold for DM as well.
Using these observations, we can now upper-bound the social cost of w and lower-bound the social
cost of o. By the definition of SC(w|x), and by applying (8) for y = w and (4) for z 6= w, we obtain
SC(w|x) = SCw(w|x) +
∑
z∈Z\{w}
SCz(w|x)
≤
3
4
δ(w, o) · λ|Dw|+
∑
z∈Z\{w}
(
δ(w, o) + δ(z, o)
)
· λ|Dz|
=
3
4
δ(w, o) · λ|Dw|+ δ(w, o) · λ
∑
z∈Z\{w}
|Dz|+
∑
z∈Z\{w}
δ(z, o) · λ|Dz|.
By (5), we further have that
SC(w|x) ≤
7
4
δ(w, o) · λ|Dw|+
∑
z∈Z\{w}
δ(z, o) · λ|Dz|
≤
7
4
∑
z∈Z
δ(z, o) · λ|Dz|. (10)
On the other hand, by the definition of SC(o|x) and by applying (9), we can lower-bound the optimal
social cost as follows:
SC(o|x) =
∑
z∈Z
SCz(o|x) ≥
1
4
∑
z∈Z
δ(z, o) · λ|Dz|. (11)
Consequently, by combining (10) and (11), the distortion of the instance I is
dist(I|DM) =
SC(w|x)
SC(o|x)
≤ 7.
Since I is an arbitrary (up to symmetry) instance of wc(DM), Lemma 3.2 implies dist(DM) ≤ 7.
4 Lower bounds on the distortion for the discrete setting
In this section, we present our lower bounds for the discrete seing. Specificallywe show the following
two statements:
• e distortion of any mechanism is at least 3− ε, for any ε > 0.
• e distortion of any strategyproof mechanism is at least 7− ε, for any ε > 0.
ese lower bounds match the upper bounds presented in Section 3. Consequently,MinimizeMedian
is the best-possible among all mechanisms (in terms of distortion), while DistributedMedian is the
best-possible strategyproof mechanism.
Before we dive into the proofs of our lower bounds, we remark that it is without loss of generality
to assume that, when given as input an instance with only two districts each of which has a different
representative, any mechanism will choose the le-most representative as the facility location; if this
is not the case, then we can obtain the very same bounds by symmetric arguments. Furthermore, in
this section, as well as in Section 5.2, we will simply write SC(z) instead of SC(z|x) for the social cost
of an alternative location z; the position profile x will always be clear from context.
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4.1 An unconditional lower bound
First, we will prove a general lemma about mechanisms that have approximation ratio less than 3− ε,
for any ε > 0.
Lemma 4.1. LetM be a mechanism with distortion strictly less than 3. Let I be an instance with set of
alternative locations A = {0, 1}, and k = 2µ + 1 districts such that 0 is the representative of µ districts
and 1 is the representative of µ+ 1 districts, for every integer µ ≥ 1. en,
(i) M(I) = 1, and
(ii) the representative of any district d for which all agents are positioned at 2µ+14(µ+1) is zd = 0.
Proof. We will prove the statement by induction on µ.
Base case: µ = 1.
For (i), assume towards a contradiction that there exists an instance I such that 0 is the representative
of one district, and 1 is the representative of two districts, butM(I) = 0. In particular, let I be the
following instance with three districts:
• In the first district, all λ agents are positioned at 1/4. e representative of this district must be
0, as otherwise the distortion of the instance consisting only this district would be 3.
• In the other two districts, all λ agents are positioned at 1. SinceM is unanimous, the represen-
tative of this district is 1.
See the le part of Fig. 2 for a graphical representation of I . Since
SC(0) =
λ
4
+ 2λ =
9λ
4
and SC(1) =
3λ
4
,
we have that dist(M) ≥ dist(I|M) = 3, a contradiction.
For (ii), assume towards a contradiction that the representative of the district in which all agents
are positioned at 2µ+14(µ+1) = 3/8 is 1. Consider the following instance J with three districts:
• In the first district, all λ agents are positioned at 0. SinceM is unanimous, the representative of
this district is 0.
• In the other two districts, all λ agents are positioned at 3/8. By our assumption, the representa-
tive of these two districts is 1.
e right part of Fig. 2 depicts instance J . Since J satisfies the properties of the lemma, by (i), it must
beM(J ) = 1. However, since
SC(0) =
6λ
8
=
3λ
4
and SC(1) = λ+
10λ
8
=
9λ
4
,
we again have that dist(M) ≥ dist(J |M) = 3, a contradiction.
Induction step:
We assume that (i) and (ii) are true for µ = ℓ− 1, and will show that they are also true for µ = ℓ.
For (i), consider an instance I with 2ℓ+ 1 districts, such that 0 is the representative of ℓ of them, and
1 is the representative of the remaining ℓ+ 1 districts. Specifically:
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0 11/4
λd1
λd2
λd3
0 13/8
λ d1
λ d2
λ d3
Figure 2: e base case of Lemma 4.1. Le: e proof of part (i). In instance I , the representative of district d1
is 0 (shaded green), as otherwise the distortion of the instance consisting only of d1 would be 3. By unanimity,
the representative of d2 (shaded red) and d3 (shaded blue) is 1 (shaded both red and blue). Right: e proof
of part (ii). In instance J , by unanimity, the representative of d1 is 0 (shaded green). We assume towards a
contradiction that the representative of d2 (shaded red) and d3 (shaded blue) is 1 (shaded both red and blue), and
obtain a distortion of at least 3.
• In each of the first ℓ districts, all λ agents are positioned at 2ℓ−14ℓ =
2(ℓ−1)+1
4((ℓ−1)+1) . By part (ii) of the
induction hypothesis, the representative of all these districts is 0.
• In each of the remaining ℓ+ 1 districts, all λ agents are positioned at 1. SinceM is unanimous,
the representative of these districts is 1.
We now have that
SC(0) = ℓ ·
(2ℓ− 1)λ
4ℓ
+ (ℓ+ 1) · λ =
3(2ℓ + 1)λ
4
and
SC(1) = ℓ ·
(2ℓ+ 1)λ
4ℓ
=
(2ℓ+ 1)λ
4
.
IfM(I) = 0 then dist(M) ≥ dist(I|M) = 3. erefore, for the mechanism to achieve distortion
strictly less than 3, it must be the case thatM(I) = 1.
For (ii), assume towards a contradiction that the representative of a district in which all agents are
positioned at 2ℓ+14(ℓ+1) is 1 instead. en, consider the following instance J with 2ℓ+ 1 districts:
• In each of the first ℓ districts, all λ agents are positioned at 0. By unanimity, the representative
of these districts is 0.
• In each of the remaining ℓ+1 districts, all λ agents are positioned at 2ℓ+14(ℓ+1) . By our assumption,
the representative of these districts is 1.
Since (i) holds for µ = ℓ, it must beM(J ) = β. However, since
SC(0) = (ℓ+ 1) ·
(2ℓ+ 1)λ
4(ℓ+ 1)
=
λ(2ℓ+ 1)
4
and
SC(1) = ℓ · λ+ (ℓ+ 1) ·
(2ℓ+ 3)λ
4(ℓ+ 1)
=
3λ(2ℓ+ 1)
4
,
we have that dist(M) ≥ dist(J |M) = 3, a contradiction.
is concludes the proof of the lemma.
We are now ready to prove the main theorem.
eorem 4.2. In the discrete seing, the distortion of any mechanism is at least 3− ε, for any ε > 0.
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0 11/2
λd1
λd2
0 11/2
λ d1 … dµ
λ dµ+1 … d2µ+1
Figure 3: e instances used in the proof of eorem 4.2. Instance I (le): By unanimity, the representative of
district d2 (shaded red) is 1. e representative of d1 (shaded green)must also be 1, as otherwise dist(I|M) = 3.
InstanceJ (right): Since districts dµ+1 to d2µ+1 are identical to d1 in I , the representative of those districts must
be 1 (shaded green). By unanimity, the representative of d1 to dµ is 0 (shaded blue). By Lemma 4.1, the facility
location on J is 1, and thus dist(J |M) = 3.
Proof. LetM be any mechanism with distortion less than 3− ε, for any ε > 0. Hence, by Lemma 2.1,
M is unanimous within districts. We consider instances with set of alternative locations A = {0, 1}.
We will first establish thatMmust choose 1 as the representative of any district in which all the agents
are positioned at 1/2. To see this, consider the following instance I with two districts:
• In the first district, all λ agents are positioned at 1/2.
• In the second district, all λ agents are positioned at 1. SinceM is unanimous, the representative
of this district is 1.
See also the le part of Fig. 3. We claim that the representative of the first district must be 1. Assume
towards a contradiction that the representative of this district is 0. en, we have one district with 0
as its representative and one district with 1 as its representative. Recall that in such a case it is without
loss of generality to assume thatM will select the le-most district representative, that is,M(I) = 0.
However, since
SC(0) =
λ
2
+ λ =
3λ
2
and SC(1) =
λ
2
,
this decision leads to dist(M) ≥ dist(I|M) = 3, a contradiction.
Finally, consider the following instance J with k = 2µ+ 1 districts (see the right part of Fig. 3):
• In each of the first µ districts, all λ agents are positioned at 0. By unanimity, the representative
of these districts is 0.
• In each of the remainingµ+1districts, allλ agents are positioned at 1/2. By the above discussion,
the representative of these districts is 1.
By Lemma 4.1, we have thatM(J ) = 1. Observe that
SC(0) = (µ+ 1) ·
λ
2
and
SC(1) = µ · λ+ (µ+ 1) ·
λ
2
=
(3µ + 1)λ
2
.
Hence, dist(J |M) = 3µ+1µ+1 = 3. By choosing µ to be sufficiently large, we obtain dist(M) ≥ 3− ε,
for any ε > 0.
is concludes the proof.
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4.2 A lower bound for strategyproof mechanisms
e following lemma will be very important for the lower bound. It establishes that a strategyproof
mechanism is essentially ordinal. at is, the outcome does not depend on the exact positions of the
agents, but only on the preference orderings over the alternative locations that those positions induce.
Lemma 4.3. LetM be a strategyproof mechanism with finite distortion. Let xd and yd be two different
district position profiles for some district d, such that for every agent i ∈ Nd and any two alternative
locations α 6= β,
• δ(xi, α) 6= δ(xi, β) and δ(yi, α) 6= δ(yi, β);
• If δ(xi, α) < δ(xi, β) then δ(yi, α) < δ(yi, β).
en, the representative of the district chosen byM is the same under both xd and yd.
Next, wewill show a lemma similar to Lemma 4.1. Before we continue, we remark that in the proofs
of this section we will construct sets of instances with one or more districts. In any instance with a
single district, its representative must necessarily also be the facility location. For ease of notation, in
case of a single-district instance I , we will use I to denote both the instance and the (single) district
of the instance.
Lemma 4.4. LetM be a strategyproof mechanism with distortion less than 7 − ε, for any ε > 0. Let I
be an instance with set of alternative locations A = {0, 1}, and k = 2µ + 1 districts such that 0 is the
representative of µ districts and 1 is the representative of µ + 1 districts, for every integer µ ≥ 1. en,
M(I) = 1.
Proof. We will prove the statement by induction on µ.
Base case: µ = 1.
We will first define a particularly structured single-district instance I1 and will argue thatM(I1) = 0.
Next, we will define a second single-district instance I2 and, using the propertyM(I1) = 0, we will
show thatM(I2) = 0 as well. Finally, we will define a third instance I3 consisting of (the district of)
I2 and two other districts, in which 1 will be the unanimous representative. By using the structure of
I2 and the propertyM(I2) = 0, we will argue that it must beM(I3) = 1. Let δ be a parameter which
can become infinitesimally small (tends to zero).
Instance I1: ere is a single district in which 3λ/4 agents are positioned at 0 and λ/4 agents are
positioned at 1/2 + δ. Hence,
SC(0) =
λ
4
·
(
1
2
+ δ
)
=
λ
8
+
λδ
4
,
and
SC(1) =
λ
4
·
(
1
2
− δ
)
+
3λ
4
=
7λ
8
−
λδ
4
.
By taking δ to be sufficiently small, it is easy to see that ifM(I1) = 1 then dist(M) ≥ 7− ε, for any
ε > 0. Hence, it must beM(I1) = 0. Because the instance consists of only one district, we also have
that the representative of this district must be 0.
Instance I2: ere is a single district in which 3λ/4 agents are positioned at 1/2− δ and λ/4 agents
are positioned at 1. Note that in both I1 and I2, the positions of the agents induce the same ordering
over the alternative locations 0 and 1, and there are no agents that are indifferent between the two
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0 11/2-δ
1/2+δ
3λ/4 λ/4
λ/43λ/4
0 11/2-δ
3λ/4 λ/4d1
λd2
λd3
Figure 4: e base case of Lemma 4.4. Le: e single-district instances I1 (shaded in dark green) and I2 (shaded
in green). e representative of the district of I1 is 0, as otherwise dist(I1|M) ≥ 7−ε. By Lemma 4.3, 0 is also
the representative of the district of I2. Right: e instance I3. District d1 (shaded green) is identical to the district
of I2, and hence its representative is 0. By unanimity, the representative of d2 (shaded red) and d3 (shaded blue)
is 1 (shaded both red and blue). e facility location on I3 must be 1, as otherwise dist(I3|M) ≥ 7− ε.
alternative locations in any of the two instances. SinceM(I1) = 0, by Lemma 4.3, it must also be the
case thatM(I2) = 0. See also the le part of Fig. 4.
Instance I3: ere are three districts which will be such that the representative of the first one is 0
and the representative of the remaining two is 1. In particular:
• e first district is identical to the district of I2: 3λ/4 agents are positioned at 1/2 − δ and λ/4
agents are positioned at 1. By the above discussion, the representative of this district is 0.
• In the other two districts, all agents are positioned at 1. By unanimity, the representative of both
districts is 1.
We have
SC(0) =
3λ
4
(
1
2
− δ
)
+
λ
4
+ 2λ =
21λ
8
−
3λδ
4
and
SC(1) =
3λ
4
(
1
2
+ δ
)
=
3λ
8
+
3λδ
4
.
By taking δ to be sufficiently small, it is easy to see that ifM(I3) = 0 then dist(M) ≥ 7− ε, for any
ε > 0. erefore, it must beM(I3) = 1, as desired. See also the right part of Fig. 4.
Induction step:
Our induction hypothesis is that the lemma is true for µ = ℓ− 1, that is,M(I) = 1 for any instance
I with k = 2(ℓ − 1) + 1 districts such that 0 is the representative of ℓ − 1 districts and 1 is the
representative of ℓ districts. Using this, we will show that the lemma is also true for µ = ℓ, that is,
M(J ) = 1 for any instance J with k = 2ℓ+ 1 districts such that 0 is the representative of ℓ districts
and 1 is the representative of ℓ+ 1 districts.
As in the base case, we will define three instances with particular properties. e first instance I
(ℓ)
1
will have 2ℓ− 1 districts partitioned into two sets of identical districts, one of cardinality ℓ and one of
cardinality ℓ− 1. Using the induction hypothesis, we will argue that the representative of each of the
first identical ℓ districts in this instance must be 0. is will then be used to show thatM(I
(ℓ)
2 ) = 0
for a particularly structured single-district instance I
(ℓ)
2 . Finally, in the third instance I
(ℓ)
3 , we will
have ℓ districts identical to (the district of) I
(ℓ)
2 and ℓ + 1 districts, in which 1 will be the unanimous
representative, and will show that it must beM(I
(ℓ)
3 ) = 1.
Instance I
(ℓ)
1 : ere are 2ℓ− 1 districts.
• In each of the first ℓ districts, λ2 +
λ
4ℓ agents are positioned at 0 and
λ
2 −
λ
4ℓ agents are positioned
at 1/2 + δ.
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• In each of the remaining ℓ− 1 districts, all λ agents are positioned at 0. SinceM is unanimous,
the representative of all these districts is 0.
We will argue that the representative of the first ℓ districts must also be 0. Assume otherwise that the
representative of these districts is 1. en, I
(ℓ)
1 is an instance such that 0 is the representative of ℓ− 1
districts and 1 is the representative of ℓ districts. Hence, by the induction hypothesis, we have that
M(I
(ℓ)
1 ) = 1. e social cost of the two alternative locations is
SC(0) = ℓ ·
(
λ
2
−
λ
4ℓ
)
·
(
1
2
+ δ
)
=
2ℓλ− λ+ δ(4ℓλ + 2λ)
8
and
SC(1) = (ℓ− 1) · λ+ ℓ
(
ℓλ
2
+
λ
4ℓ
)
+ ℓ ·
(
λ
2
−
λ
4ℓ
)
·
(
1
2
− δ
)
=
14ℓλ− 7λ− δ(4ℓλ− 2λ)
8
.
By choosing δ to be sufficiently small, we obtain that dist(M) ≥ 7−ε, for any ε > 0, a contradiction.
Consequently, it must be the case that the representative of each the first ℓ districts is 0.
Instance I
(ℓ)
2 : ere is a single district with
λ
2 +
λ
4ℓ agents positioned at 1/2 − δ and
λ
2 −
λ
4ℓ agents
positioned at 1. Note that in the district of I
(ℓ)
2 and in each of the first ℓ identical districts of I
(k)
1 , the
positions of the agents induce the same ordering over the alternative locations 0 and 1, and there are
no agents that are indifferent between the two alternatives in any of the two different profiles. Since
the representative of the first ℓ districts of I
(ℓ)
1 is 0 as we argued above, by Lemma 4.3,M(I
(ℓ)
2 ) = 0.
Instance I
(ℓ)
3 : ere are 2ℓ+ 1 districts.
• In each of the first ℓ districts, the positions of the agents are as in the district of I
(ℓ)
2 :
λ
2 +
λ
4ℓ
agents are positioned at 1/2− δ, and λ2 −
λ
4ℓ agents are positioned at 1. By the discussion above,
the representative of these districts is 0.
• In each of the remaining ℓ+ 1 districts, all λ agents are positioned at 1. SinceM is unanimous,
the representative of these districts is 1.
We have that
SC(0) = (ℓ+ 1) · λ+ ℓ
(
λ
2
+
λ
4ℓ
)(
1
2
− δ
)
+ ℓ ·
(
λ
2
−
λ
4ℓ
)
=
14ℓλ+ 7λ− δ(4ℓλ + 2λ)
8
.
and
SC(1) = ℓ ·
(
λ
2
+
λ
4ℓ
)(
1
2
+ δ
)
=
2ℓλ+ λ+ δ(4ℓλ + 2λ)
8
.
By choosing δ to be sufficiently small, ifM(I
(ℓ)
3 ) = 0 then dist(M) ≥ 7−ε, for any ε > 0. erefore,
it must beM(I
(ℓ)
3 ) = 1, concluding the proof of the induction step.
We are finally ready to prove our lower bound on the distortion of any strategyproof mechanism
in the discrete seing.
eorem 4.5. In the discrete seing, the distortion of any strategyproof mechanism is at least 7− ε, for
any ε > 0.
20
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that there exists a strategyproof mechanismMwith distortion
less than 7−ε, for any ε > 0. To prove the theorem, we will use three instancesJ1 (with two districts),
J2 (with one district) and J3 (with 2µ+1 districts); in all these instances the set of alternatives will be
A = {0, 1}. In J1, we will argue that the representative of the first district must be 1, which in turn
will imply that the representative of the single district of J2 will have to be 1. en, we will argue that
it mustM(J3) = 1, which will contradict the assumption that the distortion of the mechanism is less
than 7− ε, for any ε > 0. Let δ > 0 be an infinitesimally small constant.
Instance J1: ere are two districts.
• In the first district, λ/2 agents are positioned at 1/2 − δ, and λ/2 agents are positioned at 1.
• In the second district, all λ agents are positioned at 1. SinceM is unanimous, the representative
of this district is 1.
We will show that the representative of the first district must be 1. Assume otherwise that it is 0. en,
we have one district with 0 as its representative and one district with 1 as its representative. Recall that
for such instances it is without loss of generality to assume thatM will select the le-most district
representative, that is,M(J1) = 0. We have
SC(0) =
λ
2
(
1
2
− δ
)
+
λ
2
+ λ =
7λ
4
−
λδ
2
and
SC(1) =
λ
2
(
1
2
+ δ
)
=
λ
4
+
λδ
2
.
By taking δ to be sufficiently small, we have that dist(M) ≥ 7 − ε for any ε > 0, a contradiction.
erefore, the representative of the first district must be 1.
Instance J2: ere is a single district, in which λ/2 of the agents are positioned at 0 and λ/2 agents
are positioned at 1/2 + δ. Note that in the district of J2 and in the first district of J1, the positions of
the agents induce the same ordering over 0 and 1, and there are no agents that are indifferent between
the two locations in any of the two profiles. Since the representative of the first district of J1 is 1 as
argued above, by Lemma 4.3, the representative of the district of J2 must be 1 as well.
Instance J3: ere are 2µ+ 1 districts.
• In each of the first µ districts, all λ agents are positioned at 0. By unanimity, the representative
of these districts is 0.
• Each of the remaining µ + 1 districts is identical to the district of J2: there are λ/2 agents
positioned at 0 and λ/2 agents positioned at 1/2+δ. By the discussion above, the representative
of these districts is 1.
From Lemma 4.4, we have thatM(J3) = 1. By the definition of the districts,
SC(0) = (µ + 1) ·
λ
2
(
1
2
+ δ
)
=
µλ
4
+
λ
4
+
(µ + 1)λδ
2
,
and
SC(1) = (µ+ 1) ·
λ
2
(
1
2
− δ
)
+ (µ+ 1) ·
λ
2
+ µ · λ =
7µλ
4
+
3λ
4
−
(µ+ 1)λδ
4
.
By choosing δ to be small enough and µ to be large enough, we have that dist(M) ≥ 7− ε, for any
ε > 0.
is completes the proof.
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We remark that the lower bound of 7 also extends to ordinal mechanisms, whose decisions are based
only on the orderings over the alternative locations induced by the positions of the agents, rather than
the exact positions themselves. is follows by observing that the property established in Lemma 4.3 is
satisfied trivially by ordinal mechanisms (even without the strategyproofness requirement). Moreover,
sinceDistributedMedian is an ordinal mechanism (observe that to pinpoint the median agent within
a district and then her closest alternative, we do not really need to know the exact positions of the
agents), this bound is also matched from above, leading to the following corollary.
Corollary 4.6. e distortion of any ordinal mechanism is at least 7− ε, for any ε > 0. Moreover, there
exists an ordinal mechanism with distortion at most 7.
5 Mechanisms for the continuous setting
So far, we focused on the discrete seing, and showed thatMinimizeMedian achieves the best-possible
distortion of 3 among allmechanisms, whileDistributedMedian achieves the best-possible distortion
of 7 among all strategyproofmechanisms. We now turn our aention to the continuous seing. Wewill
first present a strategyproofmechanismwith distortion 3 in Section 5.1, followed by a lower bound of 2
for all mechanisms and a lower bound of 3 for all strategyproof mechanisms in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2,
respectively.
5.1 A strategyproof mechanism with distortion 3
Let us recall how MinimizeMedian and DistributedMedian choose the representative of a district
in the discrete seing. MM chooses the alternative location that minimizes the social cost of the agents
whereas DM chooses the location that is closer to the median agent. In the continuous seing, where
the set of alternative locations is R, the location of the median agent is known to minimize the social
cost of the agents in a district, and thus the continuous version of DM, which chooses as representative
the position of themedian agent, is an implementation ofMM. Aswe showwith the following theorem,
ContinuousDistributedMedian (CDM) inherits the best properties of MM and DM.
eorem 5.1. ContinuousDistributedMedian is strategyproof and has distortion at most 3.
e proof of eorem 5.1 relies heavily on the ideas used in the proof of eorem 3.1 to show that
DM is strategyproof, and in the proof of eorem 3.5 to show that the distortion of MM is at most 3. In
particular, the arguments used in those proofs are adapted to the continuous version to accommodate
the fact that the set of alternatives is R. To avoid being repetitive, we give a full proof in the appendix.
5.2 Lower bounds on the distortion
Wenow turn our aention to showing lower bounds on the distortion of mechanisms in the continuous
seing.
5.2.1 An unconditional lower bound
We start with a lemma quite similar to Lemma 4.1. A key difference is that we no longer have two fixed
alternative locations as we did in the discrete seing, so we will establish the lemma for two arbitrary
locations y1 and y2 with y1 < y2.
Lemma 5.2. Let M be any mechanism with distortion strictly less than 2. Let I be any instance with
k = 2µ+1 districts such that (a) the representative of µ districts is some location y1, (b) the representative
of the remaining µ+ 1 districts is some location y2, and (c) y1 < y2. en,
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(i) M(I) = y2, and
(ii) for the representative z of any district in which
• λ2 +
λ
4(µ+1) agents are positioned at some z1,
• λ2 −
λ
4(µ+1) agents are positioned at some z2 > z1,
it holds that z < z1+z22 .
Proof. We will prove the statement by induction on µ.
Base case: µ = 1.
Let y1 and y2 > y1 be any real numbers. Consider an instance I with the following three districts:
• In the first district, all λ agents are positioned at y1. By unanimity, the representative of this
district is y1.
• In the other two districts, allλ agents are positioned at y2. Again by unanimity, the representative
of these districts is y2.
Clearly, the social costs of the two representative locations are SC(y1) = 2λ(y2 − y1) and SC(y2) =
λ(y2 − y1). Since dist(M) < 2, it must be the case that theM(I) = y2.
For part (ii), let z1 and z2 > z1 be any real numbers. We will show that some location z <
z1+z2
2
must be the representative of a district d such that (a) 5λ/8 agents are positioned at z1 and (b) 3λ/8
agents are positioned at z2. Consider the following instance J with three districts:
• e first two districts are identical to district d described above. Let z be the representative of
these districts.
• In the third district, all λ agents are positioned at z1. By unanimity, the representative of this
district is z1.
Assume towards a contradiction that z ≥ z1+z22 . en, by part (i) of the statement proved above for
the base case (which holds for any y1 and y2 > y1), we know thatM(J ) = z. We have
SC(z1) = 2 ·
3λ
8
(z2 − z1) =
3λ
4
(z2 − z1)
and
SC(z) = 2 ·
5λ
8
(z − z1) + 2 ·
3λ
8
|z2 − z|+ λ(z − z1).
Observe that SC(z) is an increasing function of z, nomaerwhether z < z2 or z ≥ z2. Since z ≥
z1+z2
2 ,
SC(z) ≥ SC
(
z1 + z2
2
)
=
6λ
4
(z2 − z1).
erefore, we have dist(M) ≥ dist(J |M) ≥ 2, a contradiction. See also Fig. 5.
Induction step:
We will prove the statement for µ = ℓ, assuming that it holds for µ = ℓ− 1.
Let y1 and y2 > y1 be any real numbers. Consider the following instance I with 2ℓ+ 1 districts:
• In each of the first ℓ districts, λ2+
λ
4ℓ agents are positioned at y1 and
λ
2−
λ
4ℓ agents are positioned at
y2. By part (ii) of the induction hypothesis, the representative of these districts is some location
z ≤ y1+y22 .
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z1 z2z
5λ/8 3λ/8d1
5λ/8 3λ/8d2
λd3
Figure 5: e instance J used in part (ii) of the base case of Lemma 5.2. By unanimity, the representative of
d3 is z2 (shaded blue). We assume towards a contradiction that the representative of the two identical districts
d1 (shaded green) and d2 (shaded red) is some point z >
z1+z2
2
(shaded both green and red); in the figure it
is shown to be below z2. en, by comparing the social cost of z against the social cost of z1, we obtain that
dist(J |M) ≥ 2.
• In each of the other ℓ+1 districts, all λ agents are positioned at y2. By unanimity, the represen-
tative of these districts is y2.
By the range of possible values of z, we have
SC(z) = ℓ ·
(
λ
2
+
λ
4ℓ
)
· |z − y1|+ ℓ ·
(
λ
2
−
λ
4ℓ
)
· (y2 − z) + (ℓ+ 1) · λ(y2 − z)
≥ λ ·
(2ℓ+ 1)(y2 − y1)
2
and
SC(y2) = ℓ
(
λ
2
+
λ
4ℓ
)
(y2 − y1) = λ ·
2ℓ+ 1
4
(y2 − y1).
IfM(I) = z, then dist(M) ≥ dist(I|M) ≥ 2, a contradiction. Consequently, it must be the case
thatM(I) = y2.
For part (ii), let z1 and z2 > z1 be any real numbers, and consider the following instance J with
2ℓ+ 1 districts:
• In the first ℓ districts, all λ agents are positioned at z1. By unanimity, the representative of these
districts is z1.
• In each of the remaining ℓ + 1 districts, λ2 +
λ
4(ℓ+1) agents are positioned at z1 and
λ
2 −
λ
4(ℓ+1)
agents are located at z2. Let z be the representative of these districts.
Assume towards a contradiction (to part (ii) of the lemma) that z ≥ z1+z22 . en, by the proof of part
(i) of the induction step above (which holds for any y1 and y2 > y1), we know thatM(J ) = z. By the
range of possible values of z, we have
SC(z1) = (ℓ+ 1) ·
(
λ
2
−
λ
4(ℓ+ 1)
)
(z2 − z1) = λ ·
2ℓ+ 1
4
(z2 − z1)
and
SC(z) = ℓ · λ(z − z1) + (ℓ+ 1) ·
(
λ
2
+
λ
4(ℓ+ 1)
)
(z − z1) + (ℓ+ 1) ·
(
λ
2
−
λ
4(ℓ+ 1)
)
|z2 − z|
≥ λ ·
(2ℓ+ 1)(z2 − z1)
2
.
erefore, dist(M) ≥ dist(J |M) ≥ 2, a contradiction.
is completes the proof of the lemma.
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We are now ready to prove the main theorem.
eorem 5.3. In the continuous seing, the distortion of any mechanism is at least 2− ε, for any ε > 0.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that there exists a mechanismM with distortion smaller than
2−ε, for any ε > 0. First, we will prove that the representative y of a district d such that λ/2 agents are
positioned at 0 and λ/2 agents are positioned at 1, must satisfy y ≥ 1/2, as otherwise dist(M) ≥ 2.
Assume that y < 1/2 and consider the following instance I with two districts:
• e first district is identical to district d above.
• In the second district, all λ agents are positioned at 1. By unanimity, the representative of this
district is 1.
Recall that for any instance such that there are two districts with different representatives it is without
loss of generality to assume that the facility location is the le-most representative, that is,M(I) = y
in our case. We have
SC(y) =
λ
2
· y +
λ
2
· |1− y|+ λ · |1− y| ≥
λ(3− 2y)
2
and
SC(1) =
λ
2
.
erefore, dist(M) ≥ dist(I|M) = 3− 2y ≥ 2, a contradiction.
Now consider the following instance J with 2µ+ 1 districts:
• In each of the first µ districts, all λ agents are positioned at 0. By unanimity, the representative
of these districts is location 0.
• Each of the µ + 1 districts are identical to d: λ/2 agents are positioned at 0 and λ/2 agents are
positioned at 1. By the above discussion, the representative of these districts is some location
y ≥ 1/2.
By Lemma 5.2, it isM(J ) = y. We have
SC(0) = (µ+ 1) ·
λ
2
and
SC(y) = (µ+ 1) ·
λ
2
y + (µ + 1) ·
λ
2
|1− y|+ µ · λy
≥ (µ+ 1) ·
λ
2
+ µ · λy.
Hence,
dist(M) ≥ dist(J |M) = 1 +
2µy
µ+ 1
≥ 1 +
µ
µ+ 1
.
By choosing µ to be sufficiently large, the distortion ofM is at least 2−ε, for any ε > 0, a contradiction.
is completes the proof.
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5.2.2 A lower bound for strategyproof mechanisms
Recall that the proof of our lower bound on the distortion of strategyproof mechanisms in the discrete
seing relies heavily on Lemma 4.3. However, that lemma is no longer meaningful in the continuous
seing, because every alteration of an agent’s position immediately results in a new preference order-
ing over the locations. Instead, we will exploit the following lemma, which states that if we move any
subset of the λ agents in a district to the representative location of the district, then strategyproofness
dictates that the representative remains the same. e proof of the lemma can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 5.4. LetM be a strategyproof mechanism. Let xd be a district position profile and let y be the
representative of district d. Let S ⊆ Nd be any subset of the agents in d. en, y remains the representative
of d under the district position profile yd which is obtained from xd be moving all agents in S to y, that
is, yi = y for every agent i ∈ S and yi = xi for every i ∈ Nd \ S.
Our next lemma is very similar to Lemma 5.2, but applies only to strategyproof mechanisms with
distortion strictly less than 3.
Lemma 5.5. LetM be any strategyproof mechanism for the continuous seing with distortion strictly
less than 3. Let I be any instance with k = 2µ + 1 districts such that (a) the representative of µ districts
is some location y1, (b) the representative of the remaining µ + 1 districts is some location y2, and (c)
y1 < y2. en,M(I) = y2.
Proof. We will prove the statement by induction on µ.
Base case: µ = 1.
Consider an instance I1 with a single district in which the first 3λ/4 agents are positioned at y1, and
the remainingλ/4 agents are positioned at y2. Wewill argue that for the representative z of the district,
we have z < y2; this is obvious when z ≤ y1, therefore assume z > y1. Its social cost is
SC(z) =
3λ
4
(z − y1) +
λ
4
|y2 − z| ≥
λ
4
(2z + y2 − 3y1).
Observe that y1 is the location thatminimizes the social cost to SC(y1) =
λ
4 (y2−y1). Since dist(M) <
3, it has to be the case that z < y2.
Next, consider an instance I2 with a single district such that the first 3λ/4 agents are positioned
at z, and the remaining λ/4 agents are positioned at y2. Observe that the districts of I1 and I2 are the
same, with the only difference that the 3λ/4 agents who are positioned at y1 in I1 have been moved
to z in I2. Hence, by Lemma 5.4, the representative of the district in I2 must also be z .
Finally, consider an instance I3 with the following three districts:
• e first district is identical to the district in I2: 3λ/4 agents are positioned at z, and λ/4 agents
are positioned at y2. By the above discussion, the representative of this district is z < y2.
• In the remaining two districts, all λ agents are positioned at y2. By unanimity, the representative
of these districts is y2.
We have
SC(z) =
λ
4
(y2 − z) + 2λ(y2 − z) =
9λ
4
(y2 − z)
and
SC(y2) =
3λ
4
(y2 − z).
IfM(I3) = z, then dist(M) ≥ dist(I3|M) ≥ 3. Hence, it must to be the case thatM(I3) = y2.
See also Fig. 6.
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y1 y2z
3λ/4 λ/4I1
3λ/4 λ/4I2
y1 y2z
3λ/4 λ/4d1
λd2
λd3
Figure 6: e base case of Lemma 5.5. Le: Instance I1 consists of a single district with representative z (shaded
dark green). By Lemma 5.4, z is also the representative of the single district of instance I2 (shaded green). Right:
In instance I3, d1 is identical to the single district of instance I2, and thus its representative is z (shaded green).
By unanimity, the representative of both d2 (shaded red) and d3 (shaded blue) is y2 (shaded both red and blue).
IfM(I3) = z, then dist(I3|M) = 3, which implies thatM(I3) = y2.
Induction step:
We will now prove the statement for µ = ℓ, assuming that it holds for µ = ℓ− 1.
First, consider an instance I(ℓ) with the following 2ℓ− 1 districts:
• In each of the first ℓ− 1 districts, all λ agents are positioned at some position y. By unanimity,
the representative of these districts is y.
• In each of the remaining ℓ districts, λ/2 + λ/(4ℓ) agents are positioned at y, and λ/2 − λ/(4ℓ)
agents are positioned at some y2 > y. Let z be the representative of these districts.
Again, we will argue that z < y2; this is obviously true when z ≤ y, therefore assume z > y. In that
case, Observe that it must beM(I(ℓ)) = z by the induction hypothesis. We have
SC(z) = (ℓ− 1) · λ(z − y) + ℓ ·
(
λ
2
+
λ
4ℓ
)
(z − y) + ℓ ·
(
λ
2
−
λ
4ℓ
)
|y2 − z|
≥ λ
2ℓ− 1
4
(2z + y2 − 3y).
At the same time, we have that
SC(y) = λ
2ℓ− 1
4
(y2 − y).
and hence, since dist(M) < 3, it must be the case that z < y2.
Our next goal is to identify a district d such thatλ/2+λ/(4ℓ) agents are positioned at some location
y1 < y2, λ/2− λ/4(ℓ) agents are positioned at y2, and the representative of the district is y1.
• If z = y, then any of the last ℓ districts in I(ℓ) is such a district.
• If z 6= y, consider a district d such that λ/2+λ/(4ℓ) agents are positioned at z and λ/2−λ/(4ℓ)
agents are positioned at y2. Observe that this district is similar to each of the last ℓ districts in
I(ℓ), with the difference that the λ/2 + λ/4ℓ agents who are positioned at y in I(ℓ) are now
moved to z. erefore, by Lemma 5.4, the representative of d must be z, and since z < y2, we
have identified the desired instance.
So, in any case we have identified the district d we have been looking for, with y1 = z.
Finally, consider an instance J (ℓ) with the following 2µ+ 1 districts:
• Each of the first ℓ districts is identical to d above: λ/2 + λ/(4ℓ) agents are positioned at y1 and
λ/2− λ/(4ℓ) agents are positioned at y2. So, the representative of these districts is y1.
• In each of the other ℓ+1 districts, all λ agents are positioned at y2. By unanimity, the represen-
tative of these districts is y2.
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We have
SC(y1) = ℓ ·
(
λ
2
−
λ
4ℓ
)
(y2 − y1) + (ℓ+ 1) · λ(y2 − y1) =
3λ(2ℓ+ 1)
4
(y2 − y1)
and
SC(y2) = ℓ ·
(
λ
2
+
λ
4ℓ
)
(y2 − y1) =
λ(2ℓ+ 1)
4
(y2 − y1).
IfM(J (ℓ)) = y1 then dist(M) ≥ dist(J
(ℓ)|M) ≥ 3, a contradiction. Hence, it must beM(J (ℓ)) =
y2.
We are now ready to prove the lower bound.
eorem 5.6. In the continuous seing, the distortion of any strategyproof mechanism is at least 3− ε,
for any ε > 0.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that there exists a strategyproof mechanismMwith distortion
smaller than 3 − ε, for any ε > 0. We start from an instance I1 with a single district, in which λ/2
agents are positioned at 0, and λ/2 agents are positioned at 1. Let y be the representative of the district
(and thus the facility location). We will argue that it must be y ≥ 1. Assume otherwise that y < 1,
and let I2 be an instance with a single district that is obtained from the district of I1 by moving the
first λ/2 agents from 0 to y (the remaining λ/2 agents are still positioned at 1). Note that if y = 0,
then I1 ≡ I2. erefore, by Lemma 5.4, the representative of (the district of) I2 is y. Next, consider
an instance I3 with the following two districts:
• e first district is identical to the district of I2: λ/2 agents are positioned at y, and λ/2 agents
are positioned at 1. So, the representative of this district is y.
• In the second district, all λ agents are positioned at 1. By unanimity, the representative of this
district is 1.
We have
SC(y) =
λ
2
(1− y) + λ(1− y) =
3λ
2
(1− y)
and
SC(1) =
λ
2
(1− y).
Recall that it is without loss of generality to assume thatM selects the le-most representative for any
instance with two districts such that their representatives are difference. So, in our case,M(I3) = y.
However, this leads to dist(M) ≥ dist(I3|M) ≥ 3, a contradiction. We have now established that
the representative of (the district of) I1 must be y ≥ 1.
To complete the proof, consider an instance I with the following 2µ + 1 districts:
• In each of the first µ districts, all λ agents are positioned at 0. By unanimity, the representative
of these districts is 0.
• Each of the remaining µ+ 1 districts is identical to the district of I1: λ/2 agents are positioned
at 0 and λ/2 agents are positioned at 1. By the above discussion, the representative of these
districts is y ≥ 1.
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By Lemma 5.5, it isM(I) = y. We have
SC(0) = (µ+ 1) ·
λ
2
and
SC(y) = µλy + (µ+ 1) ·
λ
2
y + (µ+ 1) ·
λ
2
(y − 1) ≥ (3µ+ 1) ·
λ
2
.
erefore,
dist(M) ≥ dist(I|M) ≥
3µ+ 1
µ+ 1
.
By choosing µ to be sufficiently large, the distortion ofM is at least 3−ε for any ε > 0. is concludes
the proof.
6 Open problems and extensions
While for most of the cases, our upper and lower bounds are tight, there is still a gap between the lower
bound of 2 and the upper bound of 3 on the distortion of general (non-strategyproof) mechanisms in
the continuous seing. To this end, we provide the following conjecture.
Conjecture 6.1. ere exists a distributed mechanism with distortion 2 for the continuous seing.
In terms of extending and generalizing our model, there is ample ground for future work. For example,
in this paper we focused entirely on the social cost as the objective of interest, as it already poses several
challenges in the design of the best possible mechanisms. As is typical in the facility location literature,
one could also consider different objectives, such as the maximum cost or the sum of squares. Again,
the goal would be to show bounds on the distortion, and also design good strategyproof mechanisms.
Other possible extensions could include asymmetric districts, multiple facilities, more general metric
spaces, different cost functions, or studying the many different variants of the facility location problem
in the distributed seing.
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A Omitted proofs from Section 2
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
LetM be a distributed mechanism with finite distortion, and assume towards a contradiction thatM
is not unanimous. is means that there exists an instance I = (x,Z,D) such that all agents in some
district d ∈ D have the same position z ∈ Z , but zd 6= z. By the definition of a mechanism (and in
particular its the locality property), the same must be true for the instanceJ consisting of only district
d (and the same agent positions). In this case the social cost of the optimal position z is 0, whereas
the social cost of the location zd chosen by the mechanism is strictly positive, resulting in an infinite
distortion.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2.2
Assume towards a contradiction thatM is not strategyproof within districts. is means that there
exists an instance I = (x,D,Z) such that for some district d ∈ D, some agent i ∈ Nd has a beneficial
manipulation over the decision of the representative of the district. In particular, agent i can report a
position x˜di such that
• the representative of d when the district position profile is xd (corresponding to instance I) is
some alternative z ∈ Z ;
• the representative of dwhen the district position profile is (x˜di ,x−i,d) (corresponding to instance
I˜ , where the positions of all agents remain unchanged, except the position of agent i) is some
alternative y ∈ Z ;
• xi is closer to y than to z.
By the locality property ofM, such a manipulation would be possible for any district that is identical
to d. So, we can without loss of generality assume that I consists of k identical districts. Since z is
the representative of all districts in I , it must be the case thatM(I) = z. Furthermore, since I and
I˜ differ only on the reported position of agent i (that is, xi versus x˜
d
i ) in one of the districts, the fact
thatM is strategyproof implies thatM(I˜) = z. By repeating the above argument for every district,
we build a sequence of instances starting from I , such that every two consecutive instances differ only
on the reported position of a single agent who instead of xi reports x˜
d
i . Hence, the representative of
the district containing this agent changes from z to y, but the facility location chosen byM remains
z. Now, consider the last instance J in this sequence, which consists of k districts that are identical
to d in I˜ , and thus have y as their representative. As a result, it must beM(J ) = y, which however
contradicts the propertyM(J ) = z that J inherits as an instance of the sequence.
B Omitted proofs from Section 3
B.1 Proof of eorem 3.1
For DM, it suffices to show that an agent can manipulate the mechanismwithin some district. Consider
an instance with two alternative locations z0 = 0 and z1 = 1, respectively. e district consists of just
two agents located at x+ ε and 1−x, for some x < 1/2. If the agents report their positions truthfully,
then the social cost of z0 is 1 + ε, while that of z1 is 1 − ε, and thus DM will choose z1 as the facility
location. However, since the first agent prefers z0, she can misreport her position as 0. en, the social
cost of z0 is 1− x, while the social cost of b is 1 + x, leading DM to choose z0.
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For DM, consider any instance I = (x,D,A) and letw = DM(I) be the facility location chosen by
the mechanism. Let i be any agent who belongs to some district d ∈ D. We will argue that if i misre-
ports her position as beingx instead of xi, the distance betweenxi and the locationDM((x,x−i),D,A)
chosen by the mechanism will be at least the distance between xi and w. We distinguish between two
cases:
• i is not the median agent of d. In order for i to affect the outcome of the mechanism, she must
first become the median of d. Let j be the median agent of d and assume that xi ≤ xj ; the case
xi > xj is similar. To become the median, agent i has to report a position x > xj . en, either
the outcome does not change, in which case the agent does not gain anything, or the median
among the representatives changes from w to some other location z ∈ A which is the closest to
x. However, this can only happen when z > w ≥ xj , meaning that the distance between xi and
the facility location has increased.
• i is the median agent of d. If zd = w, then i has no incentive to misreport her true position, so
assume zd < w; the case zd > w is symmetric. Since w is the median among all representatives,
to affect the outcome of the mechanism, agent i has to deviate to a position x so that the closest
alternative z becomes the new median representative. Since this can only happen if z > w, the
agent has nothing to gain by doing so.
Hence, DM is strategyproof.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 3.3
Let p ∈ (z, y) by any position. We partition the set of agents S into the following four sets: A = {i :
xi ≤ z}; B = {i : xi ∈ (z, w]}; Γ = {i : xi ∈ (w, y]}; ∆ = {i : xi > y}. Now, observe that
• For every i ∈ A, δ(xi, y) = δ(xi, z) + δ(z, y) and δ(xi, p) = δ(xi, z) + δ(z, p);
• For every i ∈ B, δ(xi, y) = δ(z, y) − δ(xi, z) and δ(xi, p) = δ(z, p) − δ(xi, z);
• For every i ∈ Γ, δ(xi, y) = δ(z, y) − δ(xi, z) and δ(xi, p) = δ(xi, z)− δ(z, p);
• For every i ∈ ∆, δ(xi, y) = δ(xi, z)− δ(z, y) and δ(xi, p) = δ(xi, z)− δ(z, p).
By using SCT (z) =
∑
i∈T δ(xi, z) to denote the total distance of the agents in set T ∈ {S,A,B,Γ,∆}
from z, and using the above observations, we have
SCS(z|x) = SCA(z) + SCB(z) + SCΓ(z) + SC∆(z),
SCS(p|x) = SCA(z) − SCB(z) + SCΓ(z) + SC∆(z) + (|A|+ |B| − |Γ| − |∆|)δ(z, p),
SCS(y|x) = SCA(z) − SCB(z)− SCΓ(z) + SC∆(z) + (|A|+ |B|+ |Γ| − |∆|)δ(z, y).
Now, the assumption that SC(z|x) ≤ SC(y|x) implies that
2SCB(z) + 2SCΓ(z) ≤ (|A|+ |B|+ |Γ| − |∆|)δ(z, y). (12)
On the other hand, we want to show that SC(p|x) ≤ SC(y|x), or, equivalently,
2SCΓ(z) ≤ (|A|+ |B|+ |Γ| − |∆|)δ(z, y) + (|Γ| − |A| − |B|+ |∆|)δ(z, p).
Because of (12), the above expression (and thus our goal) is true in case |Γ| ≤ |A|+|B|−|∆|. Otherwise,
by rearranging terms in (12), it becomes
SCΓ(z) ≤ (|A|+ |B|+ |Γ| − |∆|)δ(z, y) − 2SCB(z)− SCΓ(z),
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and substituting it in the definition of SC(p|x), we obtain
SCS(p|x) = SCA(z)− SCB(z) + SCΓ(z) + SC∆(z) + (|A|+ |B| − |Γ| − |∆|)δ(z, p)
≤ SCA(z)− SCB(z)− SCΓ(z) + SC∆(z) + (|A|+ |B|+ |Γ| − |∆|)δ(z, y)
− 2SCB(z) + (|A|+ |B| − |Γ| − |∆|)δ(z, w)
= SC(y|x)− 2SCB(z) + (|A|+ |B| − |Γ| − |∆|)δ(z, w)
≤ SCS(y|x),
where the second equality follows by the definition of SC(y|x) above, and the last inequality follows
by the assumption that |A|+ |B| − |Γ| − |∆| < 0.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 3.4
Since the two moves are symmetric, it suffices to show the lemma for the case where an agent i with
xi < p ≤ z is moved to p. Consider any alternative location y ∈ A. By the optimallity of z under x,
we have that
SC(z|x) ≤ SC(y|x)
⇔ δ(xi, z) +
∑
j 6=i
δ(xi, z) ≤ δ(xi, y) +
∑
j 6=i
δ(xi, p)
⇔ δ(xi, z) − δ(xi, y) ≤
∑
j 6=i
δ(xi, p)−
∑
j 6=i
δ(xi, z). (13)
If we show that
δ(p, z) − δ(p, y) ≤ δ(xi, z)− δ(xi, y),
then, by (13), we will obtain
δ(p, z) − δ(p, y) ≤
∑
j 6=i
δ(xi, p)−
∑
j 6=i
δ(xi, z)
⇔ δ(p, z) +
∑
j 6=i
δ(xi, z) ≤ δ(p, y) +
∑
j 6=i
δ(xi, p)
⇔ SC(z|p) ≤ SC(y|p).
Now, let ∆iz = δ(xi, z) − δ(p, z) = δ(xi, p) > 0 and ∆iy = δ(xi, y) − δ(p, y). We will show that
∆iz ≥ ∆iy , which is equivalent to the desired inequality.
• If y ≤ xi, we obviously have that∆iy < 0 < ∆iz .
• If y ∈ (xi, p), we have ∆iz = δ(xi, p) = δ(xi, y) + δ(y, p) > δ(xi, y)− δ(p, y) = ∆iy .
• If y ≥ p, the decrease is exactly the same: ∆iy = δ(xi, p) = ∆iz .
is completes the proof.
C Omitted proofs from Section 4
C.1 Proof of Lemma 4.3
Since we focus only on one district, let us enumerate the agents therein as Nd = [λ] = {1, ..., λ}. We
consider a sequence of district position profiles {x
(0)
d ,x
(1)
d , ...,x
(λ)
d } for district d such that
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• x
(0)
d = xd;
• x
(j)
d = (yj ,x
(j−1)
−j,d ), for j ∈ [λ− 1];
• x
(λ)
d = yd.
at is, profile x
(j)
d is obtained from profile x
(j−1)
d by changing only the position of agent j from xj to
yj (even if xj = yj).
Assume towards a contradiction thatM outputs a different representative under xd and yd; let α
and β be those locations, respectively. is means that there exists j ∈ [λ] such that the representative
under profile x
(j−1)
d is α, while the representative under profile x
(j)
d is β. Consider the corresponding
agent j whose reported positions xj and yj differentiate the two profiles x
(j−1)
d and x
(j)
d . Note that
since both profiles induce the same ordering of alternatives, agent j prefers the same location in both
profiles over the other.
• If agent j prefers β over α, then assume that the true district profile is x
(j−1)
d . By reporting yj
instead of xj , agent j can manipulateM to choose β as the representative of d instead of α.
• If agent j prefers α over β, then assume that the true district profile is x
(j)
d . By reporting xj
instead of yj , agent j can manipulateM to choose α as the representative of d instead of β.
erefore, in either case, agent j is able to manipulateM within d, which contradicts the fact thatM
is strategyproof within districts by Lemma 2.2.
D Missing proofs from Section 5
D.1 Proof of eorem 5.1
We follow the steps used in Section 3. We first establish that CDM is strategyproof in eorem D.1 us-
ing arguments similar to those in the proof ofeorem 3.1. en, similarly to Lemma 3.2, in Lemma D.2,
we characterize theworst-case instances of themechanism in terms of distortion by showing that every
instance can be transformed into another one satisfying two particular properties. Finally, exploiting
our characterizationwe show the upper bound of 3 on the distortion of themechanism ineorem D.3,
following the roadmap in the proof of eorem 3.5.
eorem D.1. CDM is strategyproof.
Proof. Consider any instance I = (x,D), and let w = CDM(I). Let i be any agent in some district
d ∈ D, and denote by wx = CDM((x,x−i),D) the facility location chosen by the mechanism when i
unilaterally misreports her position as x 6= xi. We will argue that δ(xi, w) ≤ δ(x,wx) for any x ∈ R.
We distinguish between two cases:
• i is not the median agent of d. In order for i to affect the outcome, she must become the median
of d. Let j be the median agent of d and assume that xi ≤ xj (the case xi > xj is symmetric).
To become the median, agent i has to report a position x > xj , which is going to be the new
representative of d. en, either wx = w, or the median among the representatives becomes
wx = x. However, the laer can only happen when x > w ≥ xj ≥ xi , and thus we overall
have that δ(xi, w) ≤ δ(x,wx).
• i is the median agent of d. If w = xi, then i has no incentive to misreport her true position, so
let us assume that zd = xi < w (the case xi > w is symmetric). Since w is the median among
all representatives, to affect the outcome of the mechanism, agent i has to deviate to a position
x so that wx = x. Since this can only happen if x > w, it will then be δ(xi, w) < δ(x,wx).
37
Hence, CDM is strategyproof.
Next, we focus on bounding the distortion of the mechanism. Similarly to the analysis of MM and
DM in the discrete seing, we first characterize the structure of worst-case instances for CDM. It turns
out that the worst-case instance for CDM have the exact same structure as those for MM and DM. In
particular, let wc(CDM) be the class of instances I = (x,D) such that
(P1) For every agent i ∈ N ,
– xi ≥ CDM(I) if CDM(I) < OPT(I), or
– xi ≤ CDM(I) if CDM(I) > OPT(I).
(P2) For every z ∈ R which is representative for a set of districtsDz 6= ∅, the positions of all agents
in the districts of Dz are in the interval defined by z and OPT(I).
We now have the following characterization lemma.
Lemma D.2. e distortion of CDM is equal to
sup
I∈wc(CDM)
dist(I|CDM).
Proof. We follow the reasoning used in the proof of Lemma 3.2 for the mechanisms in the discrete
seing. We transform every instance J 6∈ wc(CDM) withM(J ) = w < o = OPT(J ) to an instance
I ∈ wc(CDM) as follows:
(T1) We move every agent with position strictly smaller than w to w.
(T2) For every location z which is representative for a non-empty set of districts inJ , we move every
agent therein whose position does not lie in the interval defined by z and o to the boundaries of
this interval.
We will argue that the sequence of instances obtained by the above transformations satisfy the follow-
ing three properties, which by induction imply that dist(J |CDM) ≤ dist(I|CDM):
• e facility location chosen by the mechanism is always w;
• e optimal location is always o;
• For any two consecutive intermediate instanceswith position profilesx andy,
SC(w|x)
SC(o|x) ≤
SC(w|y)
SC(o|y) .
e proofs of the second and third properties are similar to the proofs of the corresponding properties
in Lemma 3.2 with the only difference that the set of alternatives is R instead of A. Furthermore, the
proof of the first property resembles the proof of the corresponding property for DM in Lemma 3.2.
For completeness, since the aggregation step of CDM in the districts is a bit different than that of DM,
we present a self-contained proof for the first property, which is overall much simpler.
For (T1), consider any instance in the sequence with position profile x such that there exists a
district d ∈ D with representative zd = z, which contains some agent i with position xi < w who is
moved to w. We distinguish between two cases:
• z > w. Clearly, agent i is not the median in d, and thus moving her to w will not change the
representative of d nor the outcome of the mechanism.
• z ≤ w. By moving agent i to w, the representative of d can change from z to w if i becomes the
median agent. However, the location chosen by DM will remain the same, since w will remain
the median representative.
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For (T2), consider any instance such that there exists an alternative location z which is representative
for a non-empty set of districts Dz , and a district d ∈ Dz contains an agent i with position xi outside
the interval defined by z and o. Since xi 6= z, i clearly cannot be the median agent of d, and thus
moving i to either z or to o will not change the representative of d nor the outcome of CDM.
Given the above characterization lemma about the worst-case instances, we are now ready to com-
plete the proof of the theorem by bounding the distortion of CDM. Similarly to the notation used in
Section 3.2, let Dz be the set of districts for which z ∈ R is the representative, let Z = {z ∈ R : Dz 6=
∅} be the set of all alternative locations which are representative for at least one district, and for every
z ∈ Z , y ∈ R let
SCz(y|x) =
∑
d∈Dz
∑
i∈Nd
δ(xi, y)
be the total distance of all the agents in the districts ofDz from y. Also, recall that each district contains
exactly λ agents. e arguments used in the proof of our next statement follow closely those used in
the proof of eorem 3.5.
eorem D.3. e distortion of CDM is at most 3.
Proof. Consider any instance I = (x,D) ∈ wc(CDM). We make the following observations:
• Let z ∈ R be any location which is representative for the set of districts Dz 6= ∅. By property
(P2), for any district d ∈ Dz , we have that δ(z, o) = δ(xi, z) + δ(xi, o) for every agent i ∈ Nd.
Hence, by summing over all agents in the districts of Dz , we have
SCz(z|x) + SCz(o|x) = δ(z, o) · λ|Dz|.
As the representative of each district d ∈ Dz , z is the position of the median agent in d and thus
minimizes the total distance of the agents in d, that is,
∑
i∈Nd
δ(xi, z) ≤
∑
i∈Nd
δ(xi, o). Hence,
by summing over all districts in Dz , we have that
SCz(z|x) ≤ SCz(o|x).
By combining the above two expressions, we obtain
SCz(z|x) =
1
2
δ(z, o) · λ|Dz |. (14)
and
SCz(o|x) ≥
1
2
δ(z, o) · λ|Dz|. (15)
• Consider any alternative location z ∈ Z \{w}. By property (P1), we have thatw is the le-most
representative, and thus z > w. By (P2), we have any agent i in a district ofDz lies in the interval
defined by z and o, which means that
– δ(xi, w) ≤ δ(w, o) if z ≤ o, and
– δ(xi, w) ≤ δ(w, z) = δ(w, o) + δ(z, o) if z > o.
Since δ(z, o) ≥ 0, by summing over all the agents in the districts of Dz , we obtain that
SCz(w|x) ≤
(
δ(w, o) + δ(z, o)
)
· λ|Dz|. (16)
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• Sincew is the le-most representative (implied by (P1)) and themedian among all representatives
(which is why it is selected by the mechanism), it must be the case that w is the representative
of more than half of the districts in Z , and thus
|Dw| ≥
∑
z∈Z\{w}
|Dz|. (17)
Given the above observations, we will now upper-bound the social cost of w and lower-bound the
social cost of o. By the definition of SC(w|x), and by applying (14) for y = w and (16) for z 6= w, we
obtain
SC(w|x) = SCw(w|x) +
∑
z∈Z\{w}
SCz(w|x)
≤
1
2
δ(w, o) · λ|Dw|+
∑
z∈Z\{w}
(
δ(w, o) + δ(z, o)
)
· λ|Dz|
=
1
2
δ(w, o) · λ|Dw|+ δ(w, o) · λ
∑
z∈Z\{w}
|Dz|+
∑
z∈Z\{w}
δ(z, o) · λ|Dz|.
By (17), we further have that
SC(w|x) ≤
3
2
δ(w, o) · λ|Dw|+
∑
z∈Z\{w}
δ(z, o) · λ|Dz|
≤
3
2
∑
z∈Z
δ(z, o) · λ|Dz|. (18)
On the other hand, by the definition of SC(o|x) and by applying (15), we can lower-bound the optimal
social cost as follows:
SC(o|x) =
∑
z∈Z
SCz(o|x) ≥
1
2
∑
z∈Z
δ(z, o) · λ|Dz|. (19)
Consequently, by combining (18) and (19), the distortion of the instance I subject to CDM is
dist(I|CDM) =
SC(w|x)
SC(o|x)
≤ 3.
Since I is an arbitrary instance of wc(CDM), Lemma D.2 implies dist(CDM) ≤ 3.
D.2 Proof of Lemma 5.4
SinceM is strategyproof, by Lemma 2.2, it is also strategyproof within districts. We enumerate the
agents in S as {1, ..., |S|}, and consider a sequence of district position profiles {x
(1)
d ,x
(2)
d , ...,x
(|S|)
d }
such thatx
(ℓ)
d is the same as x, with the exception that the first ℓ ∈ [|S|] agents of S are now positioned
at y. Hence, x
(|S|)
d = yd. We will argue that for every district position profile x
(ℓ)
d in the sequence, the
representative has to be y.
First, consider x
(1)
d and the corresponding agent j ∈ Nd (agent 1 in S), who is moved from xj to
yj = y. Suppose that y is not the representative of d under x
(1)
d . en, if the true district position
profile were x(1), agent j would have incentive to misreport her position as being xj instead of yj = y,
so that the district position profile becomes x and the representative of d changes to her true position
y, thus violating strategyproofness within districts. Using this, we can now easily show the statement
by induction. In particular, assuming that y is the representative of d under district position profile
x
(ℓ−1)
d for every ℓ ∈ [|S|], we can apply the same argument for the corresponding agent who is moved
to obtain x
(ℓ)
d .
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